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Abstract 
 
 
While the numbers with completed tertiary level education are low in Africa, both relative to other 
countries and in absolute terms, they have been growing very rapidly. Three questions are addressed 
in this paper. The first is how higher education links to other forms of capital accumulation in a 
process that leads to economic growth. The second is how higher education links to job outcomes in 
particular the role of the public sector and self-employment as outcomes for graduates. The third is 
whether and how an expansion of skilled jobs can create its own demand. The paper draws on both 
macro and micro evidence to answer those questions which are placed in a long run historical context. 
It is argued that growth has been more closely linked to investment in physical capital than in 
education and this may well reflect the fact that education is most valuable when it is linked to 
technology which requires higher skills. Data from thirty two African countries are used to show that 
the returns to education, measured both by macro production functions and by micro earning 
functions, are highest for those with higher levels of education. A contrast is drawn between the role 
of higher education in providing access to public sector employment and the increasing importance of 
self-employment in Africa. The paper concludes by asking whether Africa can use its investment in 
higher skilled labour to effect a service based growth revolution.  
 
 
 
(a) This is a substantially revised version of a paper prepared for a Plenary Session on: Higher Education and 
Economic Development at the AERC Biannual Research Workshop May 29 - June 3, 2010, Mombasa Kenya. I 
am indebted to participants at that workshop for comments. Markus Eberhardt has been very generous with his 
time in assisting me in preparing and interpreting the data presented in this version of the paper. This paper 
draws on educational research undertaken as part of the Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and 
Poverty (RECOUP) funded by DfID. The research on labour market outcomes, on which the paper draws, was 
funded in part by an IDRC project on the impact of skills on job creation and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and 
in part by an ESRC funded project on informality and finance in Africa. 2 
 
1. Introduction   
Figure 1 shows the evolution of GDP for five non-African countries – the US, UK, Brazil, China and 
India – over the period from 1500 to 2000 and one African country – Ghana – over the period since 
1870. I choose these countries for three reasons as an introduction to a paper concerned with higher 
education and economic development in Africa. The first is to provide a context for the recent 
acceleration in Africa’s growth rate. The second as an introduction to the argument that the links 
between human capital formation – of which higher education is one part – are complex and unlikely 
to be invariant to the period of growth we wish to understand. The third is as a prelude to the final part 
of this paper which will ask whether all countries need to climb similar mountains or whether 
alternative paths are possible. 
Figure 1  Growth in Historical Perspective 
 
Figure 2  African GDP in Perspective  
 
Why is the historical pattern of growth a vital part of understanding the context for African 
development today? Economic development is a relatively recent historical phenomenon. In both the 
UK and the US it clearly accelerated in the early part of the nineteenth century. In two of the 
countries, Brazil and Ghana, it accelerated at the end of the nineteenth century. In India and China the 
acceleration was very much more recent dating from after 1980. Not only are these countries much 
later but in the case of China the growth rates are historically at an unprecedented rate. The reason 
there is only one Africa country on the chart is that, with the exception of South Africa, Ghana is the 
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only sub-Saharan country for which we have comparative data from Maddison (2006) before 1950. 
Figure 2 shows African growth in much more recent historical perspective. Focusing on the period 
since 1980 we see a picture which will be familiar. Africa experienced a sustained fall in income from 
the mid 1970s until the 1990s and then a relatively rapid recovery. However as the chart to the right of 
Figure 2 shows this period of fall and rise saw the take off of the Chinese and Indian economies. Both 
countries went from being poorer than Africa to being richer and growing at much faster rates. Thus 
we have the central question posed by this paper: what underlies the acceleration of the growth rate in 
other parts of the developing world, can Africa follow and what will be the role of education in this 
process?  
So what has been the role of human capital generally and expenditure on higher education specifically 
in the growth paths we have observed? That is clearly a question that has been very widely posed and 
in Section 2 I want to review some of the macro evidence and in Section 3 that based on micro 
studies. Traditionally education in Africa has been a path to public sector employment. The 
implications of that path for higher education will be the subject of Section 4. In the paper it will be 
argued that there is a tension between two roles that higher education plays. The first is a conduit of 
knowledge, the second as a path to public sector employment. How, and whether, they can be 
reconciled and linked to a process of economic development is the subject of Section 5 which acts to 
introduce the speculative part of the paper. China’s growth has shown an ability to grow at rates 
previously thought impossible, can Africa emulate this and, if so, will it be by a very different path to 
that followed by China and what role will education generally, and higher education in particular, play 
in this process? 
2.  How does human capital link to other forms of capital: the macro empirical evidence 
The key role of the increase in knowledge and the human capital which has built that knowledge in 
explaining how sustained rises in per capita income have been possible since the nineteenth century is 
not in doubt. What is in doubt, and the subject of substantial disagreement, is how education impacts 
on this growth process. In this section we will review some of that evidence and suggest why the link 
between investment in human capital and growth is much less direct than one might at first believe.  
 
The data we have presented in Figure 1 shows the long sweep of economic history dating back to 
1500. We do not have comparative education data going back so far. However due to the work of 
Barro and Lee (2010) we do have comparative data from 1950 to 2010 so we can put human capital 
accumulation in Africa in a comparative context over that more recent period and we can seek to 
understand its possible role in the very recent accelerations in growth rates which have occurred in 
China and India but not in Africa. Table 1(a) is taken from Barro and Lee (2010) which updates their 
previous data shows how the average level of education in Africa has grown relatively to the rest of 
the world. Table 1(b) shows how the percentage in higher education has also changed. Both Tables 
refer to the total population in the country aged over 15 to exclude those currently in school. What 
Table 1 shows is that education in Africa has been rising as fast, or faster, than in other countries. 
From 1950 to 2010 the average years of education in Africa increased by a factor of 4 times from 1.3 
to 5.2 years of education. This is higher than the average for all developing countries (their average 
rose 3.5 times) and much higher than the rise for advanced countries (their average rose by 1.8 times). 
It is also true that in terms of growth rates the increase in those with completed tertiary education has 
been as high in Africa as it has in other developing countries and the rise has been truly enormous. 
Between 1950 and 2010 the percentage of the population with tertiary completed education has 
increased in developing countries, including Africa, by a factor of 10. 
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Table 1(a)  Average Years of Schooling of the Total Population Aged 15 and Over 
 World  Advanced  Developing  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
  (146) (24) (122) (33) 
1950  3.2 6.2 2.1 1.3 
1960  3.7 6.8 2.6 1.5 
1970  4.5 7.7 3.4 2.0 
1980  5.3 8.8 4.3 2.8 
1990  6.1 9.6 5.2 3.9 
2000  7.0 10.7 6.2  4.6 
2010  7.8 11.0 7.1  5.2 
 
Table 1(b) Percentage with Tertiary Education Completed of the Total Population Aged 15 and 
Over 
 World  Advanced  Developing  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
  (146) (24) (122) (33) 
1950  1.1 2.8 0.5 0.1 
1960  1.4 3.5 0.7 0.2 
1970  2.0 5.1 1.0 0.2 
1980  3.1 8.3 1.6 0.3 
1990  4.4 11.6 2.6  0.5 
2000  5.9 15.4 3.8  0.7 
2010  6.7 14.5 5.1  0.9 
Source: Barro and Lee (2010). The figures in ( ) parentheses are the number of countries included in the data. 
 
These rapid growth rates reflect in part the very low levels of education in Africa at the start of the 
period. It is also true the levels with a tertiary education in Africa remain very low, just under 1 per 
cent of the population aged over 15 which remains far below the level of Asia and other developing 
areas. These basic facts suggest two questions. First, how can we reconcile the high growth rates of 
education in Africa with its low growth rate in incomes? Second, do the low levels of education in 
Africa, particularly at the higher level, limit Africa’s ability to initiate the kind of growth accelerations 
we have seen in other countries?  
 
Prichett (2001, 2006) draws attention to the fact that while the micro relationship between earnings 
and education is one of the most robust empirical relationships in economics the same is not true at 
the macro level. The relationship between aggregate levels of education and growth or GDP has been 
investigated primarily in the context of the empirical Solow model set out in a very influential paper 
by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). A major divide in the empirical implementation of this model is 
whether identification is obtained by exploiting the cross-section or the time series aspects of the data.  
Broadly speaking those who use the cross section variation in the data find highly significant and 
substantial effects from human capital on income while those who exploit the time series of the data, 
find as in Prichett (2001,2006) that changes in income are not at all closely related to changes in 
education.  
 
What might account for this difference between cross-section and time series findings? There are, at 
least, three possible sources for this divergence. The first is that the cross section relationship is due 
not to any causality from education onto income but that both are driven by some common time-
invariant factor which is removed once the data is differenced. The second is that education is 
measured very poorly and that differencing the data enhances that measurement error making it 5 
 
difficult or impossible to find a relationship between changes in education and changes in income (see 
Krueger and Lundahl (2001)). The third is that with a short panel it is difficult to capture both the 
time-invariant and dynamic aspects of a specification such as has been attempted by the approach 
pioneered by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). Their framework begins with a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function in which human as well as physical capital is incorporated.  
 
         
    
                     
   
where     is physical capital,     is human capital,     is the labour force and     is total factor 
productivity (TFP) which is assumed to be labour augmenting. In empirical implementation of this 
model various proxies for human capital are used. A specification that underlies the macro growth 
accounting exercise of Hall and Jones (1999) is of the following form: 
 
                 
 
where      is the years of education of the workforce. This definition of human capital has the 
advantage that it can be explicitly linked to the form of the Mincerian earnings function used in micro 
studies of the return to education. If we are willing to make an explicit assumption as to the form of 
the function linking education to human capital        as in: 
  
                          
        
 
Then we can write the value of human capital as: 
     
                                 
 
where    is the price of human capital and    the price of labour and derive the Mincerian earnings 
function in this macro context which we will meet again when we come to the micro evidence: 
   
                             
        
 
As at the macro level wage data is not available (or at least not used) testing the model involves either 
calibration or the estimation of the production function set out above or, by following the approach 
pioneered by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), estimating a convergence equation of the form: 
  
  
 
  ,   
    
 
  , 
     l n
 
  
   
   
1    
            
 
1    
     
   
 
1    
     
          0           
 
where  n is the rate of population growth, g the rate of technical progress and   the rate of 
depreciation,    
  the rate of saving of physical capital and    
  the rate of saving of human capital. In 
this equation it can be shown that where  1          then              1     is the rate of 
convergence. 
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Bloom, Canning and Chan (2005) specifically address the role of higher education in Africa using this 
conditional convergence specification. They argue that there is some evidence that tertiary education 
raises the rate of technological convergence once instruments are used. Gyimah-Brempong, Paddison 
and Mitiku (2006) also investigate the role of tertiary education in Africa and report results of a 
convergence specification using instruments but now being explicit that the dynamic specification 
requires a GMM estimator. They find very large effects from higher education onto growth once they 
instrument.  
In contrast to these empirical models is an approach to assessing the role of human capital which 
calibrates macro models. As they wish to link the Mincerian earnings function to the value of human 
capital Hall and Jones (1999) simplify the production function to the following two factor form where 
technical progress is now assumed to be human capital augmenting: 
         
                   
 
which leads to an estimatable production function of the form: 
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This simplifed form of the production function ensures that with an assumption about the Mincerian 
return to education, which is defined as        , it is possible to decompose productivity differences 
across countries into those due to human capital, those due to differences in the capital output ratio, 
and a residual which is underlying differences in TFP. Hall and Jones (1999) use this framework and 
find that human capital can explain relatively little of the large productivity differentials across 
countries. The assumptions underlying this exercise are implicit in the above model namely that 
technical progress is human capital enhancing and, which is crucial, that different levels of education 
are perfect substitutes. Caselli and Coleman (2006) relax this last assumption and calibrate a macro 
model with imperfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled labour. They argue that the 
efficiency with which skilled labour is used increases with the level of income and this can fully 
explain differences in labour productivity across countries. In other words they reverse the Hall and 
Jones (1999) conclusion. Differences in income are not due to TFP they are due to differences in the 
efficiency with which skilled labour is used which is clearly open to the interpretation that it is the 
efficiency with which education impacts of labour efficiency which is crucial for understanding 
differences in per capita incomes. 
 
In Table 2 ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and first differenced (FD) estimates of the 
following two production functions are presented for 32 African countries (given in Appendix 1):  
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The first of these is is of the same form as that implicitly used by Hall and Jones (1999) where        
is the average years of education for the country. The second extends the specification so that 
primary, secondary and tertiary education are separately identified. In linking these empirical  7 
 
Table 2 Dependent Variable Ln (Real GDP) for sub-Saharan African Countries 
(a) 
OLS OLS  FE  FE  FD FD 
[1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Ln (Population)  0.44  0.54  0.17  0.3  0.39  0.44 
[12.07]*** [14.74]***  [0.49]  [1.00]  [1.71]*  [1.94]* 
Ln (Capital stock)
(b)  0.52 0.45  0.74  0.75  0.54  0.54 
[13.47]*** [11.97]***  [8.44]***  [9.28]***  [9.81]*** [9.65]*** 
Yr_sch
(c)  0.08 0.07 0.05 
[3.77]*** [1.86]*  [1.54] 
Yr_sch_pri 0.01  -0.02  -0.03 
[0.27] [0.41]  [0.63] 
Yr_sch_sec 0.19  0.22 0.15 
[2.96]*** [2.53]**  [1.70]* 
Yr_sch_ter 4.31  -1.05  0.21 
[4.22]*** [1.20]  [0.26] 
Constant 3.93 4.1  2.99  0.99  0  0 
[7.35]*** [8.27]***  [0.61]  [0.25]  [0.04]  [0.12] 
Observations 280  280 280 280  257  257 
R-squared 0.88  0.89  0.9  0.91  0.4  0.41 
Robust t statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Number of countries  32  32 
 
(a) The measure of GDP is taken from the PENN World Tables 6.3 and uses ‘rgdpl’ which is "Real GDP per 
capita (Constant Prices: Laspeyres), derived from growth rates of c, g, i in 2005 constant US prices". This per 
capita number is multiplied by population to get GDP. The countries included in the sample are given in 
Appendix 1.  
 
(b) The capital stock has been accumulated from the investment data by the methods used by Klenow and 
Rodríguez-Clare (1997). See Appendix 2 for details.  
 
(c) Yr_sch is the years of education Yr_sch_pri is the years of primary education, Yr_sch_sec is the years of 
secondary education and Yr_sch_ter is the years of tertiary education, all for the population aged over 15, from 
Barro and Lee (2010). 
 
The sample uses data from 1960 to 2004. The income and capital data is averaged over five year periods from 
1960-1964 to 2000-2004 inclusive, making a panel data set of nine periods across 32 countries. The education 
data is available only every five years and the data used for the period 1960-1964 is the years of education for 
1960 etc. 
 
Summary statistics are given in Appendix 3 with details of the sample. 
 
 
estimates to the assumptions underlying the macro calibration exercises two points stand out. The first 
is that the point estimate on capital of 0.45 in the OLS (it is higher for the FE and FD estimators)  far 
exceeds the value of 0.3 assumed in the calibration exercises. The second is that there is clear 
evidence that the returns to education are convex not concave as is assumed in the calibration   
excercises of Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli and Coleman (2006). The OLS results give higher 
returns for secondary than for primary education and much higher returns for tertiary. 
 
These secondary and post-secondary returns appear to be high but the numbers need to be interpreted 
with some care. Table 2 Column [1] implies that if the average years of secondary schooling in the 
African population doubled from 0.6, its average over the period since 1960, to 1.2 then GDP per 8 
 
capita would rise by 12 per cent. Similarly if the average years of tertiary education doubled from 
0.03 to 0.06 GDP per capita would increase by the same amount. The implication is that even with 
these OLS estimates, which appear highly significant and large, very large changes in the population 
with seondary and post-secondary education have very modest effects on GDP per capita.  
 
The data from Barro and Lee show that in 1950 among the advanced countries, mainly OECD 
members, the average level of education was little above primary school. Further the advances in 
education post-date the accelerations in growth rates shown so clearly in Figure 1, a point emphasised 
by Pritchett (2001, 2009). Such correlations suggest that education may be caused by growth rather 
than causing it, a possibility investigated by Bils and Klenow (2000) who argue on the basis of their 
macro data that causality does run from growth to education rather than the normal assumption which 
underlies the growth accounting literature that education causes growth. It seems very clear that 
causality may go both ways and in the African context we need to recognise that education and 
growth may be related in both directions. If that is so then the above effects which we have already 
noted are moderate, may well be overstatements of any causal effects of education onto GDP.  
 
Table 2 has presented education effects in the context of a formal production function. In 
investigating how closely investments in education are related to changes in income the approach 
adopted by Pritchett (2001, 2009) is a graphical one. We show in Figure 3 how incomes and education 
are related for Africa. The left hand chart in Figure 3 shows for the average of 2000-2004 the 
correlation between the Barro and Lee measure of human capital – the average years of education of 
the population aged over 15 – and the measure of world incomes from the PENN (6.3) World Tables, 
(see Heston, Summers and Aten (2009)). The right hand chart shows a similar plot of the changes in 
income and the changes in education over the period from 1960 to 2000 again based on the same five 
year averages that underlie Table 2. While the correlation between GDP and education appears quite 
close when we look at levels it is much less so when we look at growth rates.  
 
Figure 3 Incomes and Education in sub-Saharan Africa 
(1) GDP per Capita in 2000-2004  (2) Changes in GDP per Capita: 1960-2004  
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This last point is the one emphasised by Pritchett (2009). He argues that if we want to understand 
changes in income then there is little, if any, correlation between those changes and changes in the 
level of education. Indeed for the world data which underlie Prichett’s analysis there is a slight 
negative relationship. Again this result needs to be treated with caution. Firstly the pattern for Africa 
appears different from other countries with education having a stronger impact than for non-African 
countries for the production function estimated in Table 2. Secondly while there is only a rather weak 
correlation between changes in education and changes in income the point estimate on the relationship 
shown in chart 2 of Figure 3 of 0.08 is identical to that shown in the regression of Table 2 implying 
that this effect appears not to work through physical capital .  
 
In Figure 4 we present a similar chart for the relationship between GDP and the physical capital stock.  
Again we see that the relationship in changes is weaker than the relationship in levels but, and this 
point is critical, the relationship in changes is much closer than that for education. It will be noted that 
even in differences the point estimate on the capital stock is 0.5, which is far above the 0.3 assumed in 
the calibration exercises. As for Figure 3 the data is confined to sub-Saharan African countries 
although a very similar pattern emerges for the data for all countries.  
 
Figure 4 Incomes and Physical Capital in sub-Saharan Africa 
(a) GDP per Capita in 2000-2004  (b) Changes in GDP per Capita: 1960-2004  
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Figures 3 and 4 present the limits of how either physical or human capital can explain the changes in 
output we have seen over the period from 1960 to 2004. They need to be compared with the results 
reported in Table 2 where we do not impose constant returns to scale and we allow both physical and 
human capital to determine GDP. It is clear from Table 2 that physical capital dominates human 
capital as a determinant of output. However this result depends on a value for the parameter on capital 
which is known to be inconsistent with the share of capital in GDP from the national accounts. That 
result is also found for all countries and remains an anomaly which must give rise to reservations as to 
whether the effects of human capital have been modelled correctly.  
 
The graphical analysis has focused on the role of years of education in determining GDP. We stress 
again this is the average, it is clear from the results in Table 2 that for Africa these effects are higher 
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at higher levels of education in the macro data and this result is robust across all the estimators we 
report in that Table. What is not robust across the estimators is the role of tertiary education. While 
the effects of tertiary education are large and highly significant in the OLS this is not the case for 
either the fixed effect or first difference estimator. This may reflect the inability to capture the effect 
but more likely it is that it does reflect bias from some time-invariant common factor.  
 
These results present us with a puzzle. How can physical capital be so dominant in the macro data? It 
seems clearly absurd to think that if all Tanzania did was to change its physical capital stock so it 
looked like the US it would have the US level of income. One possible answer is that we cannot 
change the physical capital stock without changing the level of education and that we must look 
elsewhere for an understanding of how productivity links to education. In the next section we pose 
this question of the micro data.  
 
3.  Human capital and incomes: the micro empirical evidence 
How can we reconcile these very high growth rates of education with the very low growth of incomes 
within Africa? Further, how can they be reconciled with the results of micro studies which report very 
high returns on education? And how is what we observe related to the patterns of growth within 
education? We will argue that the answer to all these questions is related to the underlying shape of 
the earnings function. Understanding that is the key to understanding the results we observe for the 
average level of education. Further the shape of the earnings function has implications for the possible 
reasons as to why the demand for higher education has been expanding so rapidly in economies with 
low growth rates.  
 
The earnings function is probably the most studied relationship in empirical economics. Its origins lie 
in seminal studies by Becker (1962) and Mincer (1974) investigating how individual earnings are 
related to investments in human capital specifically education and experience in the labour market. In 
a recent review of the history of the Mincerian earnings function Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2009) 
argue that the US census data does not support the linearity assumption between the log of earnings 
and education which underlies the Mincerian model. The implications of non-linearity in the earnings 
education function are wide ranging. If this relationship is non-linear then the value of education in 
the early part of the education cycle is in part the value of being able to continue to the next stage. 
Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2009) term this the “option value” of education.  
 
What does determine the shape of the earnings function and can we identify it? To see the nature of 
the problem and why the shape of the function is so critical for any discussion of investment in higher 
education re-consider the most basic earnings function which we have already introduced in the 
context of macro production functions: 
 
                           
        
 
In the context of the micro earnings function this specification would be extended to include work 
experience and, in the original Mincerian specification, linearity. An extension of this function would 
be of the following form: 
 
Ln      φ       φ           φ         
   α  
        11 
 
(.) 1  is the function capturing the effect of schooling on wages. The return to experience (denoted
it Exper ) is captured in  2   and  3   while α 
  is unobserved labour market ability. This is the form of 
the function used by Belzil and Hansen (2002). At the micro level the central concern has been the 
potential endogeneity of education in such a specification which would arise if market ability was 
correlated with education. The Belzil and Hansen (2002) formulation is unusual in two respects. The 
first is that they are agnostic as to the shape of the earnings function. The second is that they explicitly 
model the possible correlation between aptitude for schooling and market ability in the context where 
different types of individuals can be identified.  
 
An extension of the notion that there is an individually specific aspect of the return to education 
adopts a linear specification but one in which the return to education is individually specific as in: 
 
          α  
           φ          φ         
        
 
This specification allows for heterogeneity both in the level of earnings   
  and in the returns to 
earnings   . The equation can be rewritten in the following form so that it is clear that the parameter 
on     is an average treatment effect,    :  
 
          α  
                         φ           φ         
        
 
It is an equation of this form that is the focus for the Card (2001) analysis as to the potential sources 
of bias in the OLS estimate of the earnings function. Specifically the Card paper seeks to assess 
whether an instrumental variable approach can successfully address the endogeneity problems posed 
by this equation. An important result is that attempts to allow for the potential correlation between 
ability and schooling have led to estimates of the return to education which are higher than those in 
OLS. What might account for such a finding? One possibility, assessed by Card (2001), is that the 
experiments which underlie the attempt to allow for the endogeneity of education are focusing on a 
lower part of the educational distribution where the returns are concave.  
 
A second explanation, which is reviewed by Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2009), is in terms of 
comparative advantage. Interpreting the results of an earnings function as causal implies that the 
earnings of those with say 15 years of education can be compared with those with 10 such that the 
difference is the earnings increment for those with the additional five years of education. However 
what if those with 15 years of education would have had lower earnings than those with 10 years if 
they had themselves only had 10 years of education. In that case the OLS results are an underestimate 
of the return for those who do go on to get 15 years of education. Essentially this is an argument that 
comparative advantage will play an important role in determining the actual returns to education.  
 
What does the earnings function look like if we estimate the function by OLS with controls for market 
experience? Figure 5 shows the results of an earnings function which pools data across 22 countries 
and several time periods. The data is from Trostel, Walker and Woolley (2002) where the data across 
countries has been made comparable by converting the local currency into purchasing power parity 
US$.
1  
                                                      
1 There are 26 countries in the Trostel, Walker and Woolley (2002) data set of which 22 are used in Figure 5, 
they are Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Switzerland, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 12 
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Two features of the data are striking. The first is that the earnings function is clearly non-linear, the 
second is that education explains a relatively small share of the income across the individuals in the 
data. The shape of this function appears to be convex up to about 15 years of education and concave 
after that point. It is of course at exactly that point that tertiary education begins. The finding that 
education explains a relatively small share of the distribution of earnings has led some to argue that 
the theory is grossly incomplete as an explanation of earnings. Mortensen (2003, p. 1) writes: 
“Although hundreds if not thousands of empirical studies that estimate so-called human capital wage 
equations verify that worker characteristics that one could view as indicators of labor productivity are 
positively related to wages earned, the theory is woefully incomplete in its explanatory power. 
Observable worker characteristics that are supposed to account for productivity differences typically 
explain no more than 30 per cent of the variation in compensation across workers in these studies”.  
 
The data underlying Figure 5 provides a context for this argument of Mortensen. The person on the 
earnings function with fifteen years of education will earn more than twice the one with five year of 
education, which converts into a Minerian rate of return of about 8 per cent per annum. We can either 
be impressed at the value of education – it doubles earnings – or distressed that there is so much 
variation of earnings for those with identical levels of education which is true both within and across 
countries.  
 
The other important feature of the earnings function shown in Figure 5 is that over much of its range it 
is clearly convex. Such convexity contrasts with the argument of Psacharopoulos that the return to 
education is concave (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2001).
2 If in fact the 
earnings function is convex, so that the marginal returns to education are lowest for the individuals 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden,  and the US. 
While there is no panel element to the data there are repeated cross sections for most of the countries. 
2 In a series of papers Bennell (1996a,b; 2002) has argued that the pattern of the returns to education do not 
follow that asserted by Psacharopoulos (1994). Bennell’s underlying arguments are consistent with the shape 
being convex. Direct evidence of convexity in some parts of the domain of the earnings function is provided by 
Belzil and Hansen (2002) for the U.S. and by Kingdon and Unni (2001) and Duraisamy (2002) for India. 
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with the least education, giving priority to investment in primary education may have little impact on 
incomes unless the individuals affected by the reforms proceed to higher levels of education. Further 
the convexity of the earnings function will provide a powerful incentive to pursue higher education 
even though the returns to lower levels of education are modest. It is for this reason that the shape of 
the earnings function facing those investing in education is so crucial. 
 
If the shape of the earnings function is as shown in Figure 5 for Africa (the data on which it is based 
does not contain African countries) then we have at the individual level the answer to the question 
posed in the introduction as to how higher education impacts on earnings. But what is the evidence for 
Africa? In Figure 6 we have collated the data for wage employees taken from a series of 
manufacturing firm level surveys in Africa over the period from the early 1990s to 2003.  
 
Figure 6: Earnings in Manufacturing Firms in Africa 
 
Source: The data for Ghana and Kenya are from the sources given in Bigsten et al (2000). The Tanzanian data is 
from Kahyarara (2005). The Nigerian data are those used in Malik and Teal (2008).  
These are all economies in which both manufacturing and wage employment are a small part of the 
economy. Thus issues of selection are likely to be of particular importance. In Söderbom, Teal, 
Wambugu and Kahyarara (2006) these issues of endogeneity are investigated for the Kenyan and 
Tanzanian data. They can find no evidence that the clear pattern of convexity apparent in the data is 
due to a selection process by which the relatively able enter at higher levels. What is also striking is 
that the pattern is even more strongly convex that that shown in Figure 5 which is confined to non-
African countries. It is clearly highest for those with tertiary education. 
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In seeking to compare the returns to higher education in Africa with those shown in Figure 5 we face 
other problems. The first is that many tertiary educated people work in the public sector and we need 
data that allows us to distinguish between public and private employment. The second is that the 
employment outcomes amongst the educated have been changing as the structure of employment 
within African economies has been changing. As we will discuss below one of the most important 
employment trends in Africa is the rise in informal employment in the form of self-employment and 
the small scale firm sector, Kingdom, Sandefur and Teal (2006). It is quite possible that the returns to 
education will differ by these sectors of employment and we need appropriate data in order to be able 
to address that question. 
 
We need to be able to compare those in wage and non-wage employment. There is much less 
comparative work on which we can draw. However some recent work at the CSAE has sought to 
provide direct comparisons of the returns to wage and self-employment in Ghana and Tanzania. 
Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2010) investigate labour market outcomes of urban workers in Ghana and 
Tanzania. They find that the returns to education are far higher in the large firm sector than in others 
and in this sector they are linear not convex. In both countries there is clear evidence of convexity in 
the returns to education for the self-employed and here the average returns are low. It is possible that 
the pattern of convexity which is so pronounced in Figure 6 hides important differences across firms 
of differing size. However, as they stand, both the firm level data and that for self-employment from 
labour force surveys points to a pattern of convexity in the returns to education very similar to the 
international pattern reported in Figure 5. 
 
4.  Jobs and Higher Education: Where do the tertiary educated work and why? 
The last section focused on how the returns to education differ by its level. That discussion was 
exclusively concerned with the productivity effects of investing in education. As was noted in the 
introduction that is not the only role played by investment in education. The jobs individuals have are 
closely linked to their levels of education and the returns to education operate in part through access 
to particular types of jobs.  
 
We noted above that one empirical finding which surprised researchers was that once one sought to 
allow for the possible bias in the OLS the instrumental variable results suggested these estimates were 
downward biased. A second empirical “surprise” in the measurement of the return to education was 
that, at least in the US, the return to education rose when the levels of education rose. A finding 
clearly at variance with any simple model of the demand and supply of skills by which increasing 
skills would reduce their price. The key facts were set out in a paper by Acemoglu (1999) which also 
sought to explain them: 
  
 “Between 1979 and 1987, the average weekly wages of college graduates with one to five years of 
experience increased by 30 percent relative to the average weekly earnings of comparable high-school 
graduates [sources given in the paper] .. after controlling for education and experience, the differential 
between the ninetieth and the tenth percentile wages stood at 118 percent in 1988 compared to 92 
percent in 1970 .. the rise in inequality over this period was not only due to wage increase for highly 
paid workers. Real wages of high-school graduates with one to five years of experience, for example, 
fell by 20 percent from 1979 to 1987. Meanwhile the unemployment rates of all education groups 
have increased. In 1970 the unemployment rate for civilian males between the ages of 25 and 64 with 
less than four years of high school was 4 per cent. For those with high-school and college degrees, the 15 
 
same numbers were 2.4 per cent and 1.1 percent. Averaged between 1992 and 1994 the 
unemployment rates for these three groups were respectively 13.9 percent, 6 percent and 3.2 percent, 
approximately three times higher than the rates during the 1970s.” Acemoglu (1999) 
 
So how can these key facts be explained? Acemoglu builds a model which suggests that when the 
supply of skills increases the incentives of firms to create more skilled jobs also increase. Why? The 
intuition of the model is that if both the productivity differential between skilled and unskilled 
workers and the share of the workforce that is skilled is sufficiently low then firms will not have an 
incentive to create high quality jobs. However as both dimensions of skills increase firms may find in 
more profitable to create higher quality jobs and the economy will flip to a new equilibrium with two 
classes of firm. In other words in moving between equilibria the wages of skilled workers will rise, 
those of unskilled workers will fall and unemployment will increase.
3  
This model is of relevance to any attempt to understand what expanding the supply of skilled labour 
may do. The growth in the tertiary educated, which as we showed in section 2 has occurred in Africa 
as fast as it has occurred elsewhere, has in other countries been associated with a rise in their price 
and the expansion of jobs for the relatively skilled. How have jobs in Africa changed over the 
relatively recent past?  
 
Figure 7 which is taken from Kingdon, Sandefur and Teal (2006) provides a comparative answer to 
that question over the decade of the 1990s. The pattern is clear that where jobs, as distinct from open 
unemployment, have been expanding it has been in the self-employed sector. More recent data from 
Ghana shows in the period since 1999 a rapid expansion of wage employment in small firms, 
Nsowah-Nuamah, Teal and Awoonor-Williams (2010). So what we observe is a fall in public sector 
employment and a rise in employment in small scale enterprises.  
 
In order to link the outcomes shown in Figure 7 to higher education we need to know how the 
probability of changing occupation relates to the level of education. In Table 3 the data is drawn from 
a study of urban outcomes in Ghana and Tanzania for 2004 and 2005, Rankin, Sandefur and Teal 
(2010). It shows in Ghana and to a greater extent in Tanzania a pattern by which the probability of 
being employed in the public sector rises with education and is highest for those with university 
education. That fact is not a surprise. What is more striking is that after employment in the public 
sector it is self-employment that is by far the most common outcome, not employment in private 
firms.  
 
 
                                                      
3 “A more novel explanation for the U.S. labor market trends also emerges from this simple model. The supply 
of skilled workers in the U.S. labor market increased sharply during the 1970’s. A simple relative supply-
demand approach would predict a decline in the relative wages in response to this increase. In the data, however, 
the large increase in the supply of skills during the 1970’s is followed by a rise in the skill premium. In my 
model, when skilled workers become more abundant, firms find it profitable to design jobs for them rather than 
pool across the two skill groups. This transforms the structure of the labour market, increasing returns to 
education, residual inequality and unemployment. Therefore in contrast to the conventional approach, my theory 
predicts that even if technological possibilities remain unchanged, an increase in the proportion of skilled 
workers can switch the economy from a pooling to a separating equilibrium and increase inequality.” (page 
1265) 
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Figure 7 Trends in Non-Agricultural Employment by Sector  
(Absolute No. of Workers in Thousands) 
The right hand axis refers to Ethiopia and South Africa and the left hand axis to the other countries 
 
 
So how do earnings compare across these occupations? Again drawing on the same data this is shown 
in Table 4. We see there, as we would expect from the data in Table 3, that those in public 
employment have very substantially higher levels of education than those in the private sector. In 
Ghana, but not in Tanzania, education levels are higher in larger firms. In the case of self-employment 
and work in small firms the levels of education are similar at 9 years in Ghana, essentially the end of 
junior secondary school and at 7 in Tanzania, essentially the end of primary school. The earnings gap 
between those in small scale employment and those in public sector is substantial, over twice in both 
Ghana and Tanzania. 
 
Table 3  Probabilities of Being in Occupations as a Function of Education  
 
Ghana  
 Self-
employment 
Small Firm  Large Firm  Public Sector 
No 
employment 
None  0.62 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.27 
Junior 
Secondary  0.52 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.32 
Senior 
Secondary  0.42 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.36 17 
 
University  0.29 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.37 
 
 
Tanzania  
None  0.79 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.10 
Junior 
Secondary 
0.72 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.05 
Senior 
Secondary 
0.62 0.06 0.05 0.24 0.04 
University  0.41 0.03 0.03 0.50 0.03 
Source: Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2010). 
 
 
Table 4 Earnings and Education in Urban Ghana and Tanzania: 2004-2005 
Ghana Tanzania 
Ln (Monthly 
Earnings in 
1995 prices) 
Monthly 
Earnings in 
US$ 
Education in 
Years 
Ln (Monthly 
Earnings in 
1995 prices) 
Monthly 
Earnings in 
US$ 
Education in 
Years 
Mean Median  Median Mean Median  Median 
Self  10.92 45  9  5.43  39  7 
Employment  (754)   (618)   
   
Small  10.67 34  9  5.12  33  7 
Firm  (157)   (72)  
   
Large   11.47 72  11  5.80  57  7 
Firm  (123)   (69)  
   
Public  11.77 98  14  6.20  98  12 
(97)   (151)   
   
Not   NA NA  10  NA NA  7 
Employed  (509)     (61) 
   
Total  11.02 45  10  5.57  47  7 
(1131) (1131) (1640)  (910)  (910)  (971) 
Figures in ( ) are the number of observations. 
Source: Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2010). 
 
These results show the dilemma facing the newly educated in these countries. The higher paying jobs 
are contracting relative to the low paying ones and those with higher levels of education are finding it 18 
 
increasingly difficult to find work either in the public sector or large firms. It is possible, we do not 
know, that these changes are affecting the return to higher education.  
 
 
 
 
5.  Must countries climb similar mountains or can they play leap frog? 
 
What we have seen in Africa in the period since the mid 1990s is a rapid recovery from the falls in 
income of the previous decades. While this recovery is clearly a dramatic improvement in the 
performance of economies within Africa it has occurred at a time when other countries, particularly 
China and India, have seen spectacular rises in their underlying growth rates. We began this essay by 
putting those accelerations into an historical perspective. Their common characteristics are that they 
were very recent and very rapid. In understanding the potential for economic development in Africa 
we need to understand how Africa can grow equally rapidly and, for the purposes of this essay, the 
role of education generally and higher education in particular in that process. 
 
One interpretation of the experience of India and China is that they have benefited from being so 
behind. In China the productivity gains from shifting from rural to urban based activities may have 
been substantial. In India the liberalisation of the 1980s combined with the revolution in technology 
made possible rapid growth of the service sector. The rapid advances of mobile phone technology in 
Africa have raised the prospect that Africa too could see a service based revolution. The patterns of 
growth differ greatly between India and China and these differences imply very different patterns for 
the demand for the relatively skilled labour produced by the higher education sector. 
 
Broadly speaking a service based IT sector requires much more skilled labour than a manufacturing 
based export sector. In India the IT sector has been a major employer of graduates. As we have seen 
where we have data in Africa the service based self-employed sector is becoming an important 
employment outcome for the higher educated. 
 
This rise of self-employment in Africa is open to at least two very different interpretations related to 
the title of this section – must countries climb similar mountains or can they play leap frog? One view 
would be that there is a given pattern of economic development by which poor labour intensive 
countries need to begin with exports of goods which are labour intensive. China would be seen as a 
classic example of such a successful growth strategy. This is the view that countries need to climb 
similar mountains and that as they grow output will shift to higher skill activities as wages rise. 
Another view is that the revolution in information technology has opened up potentially different 
paths, ones using skilled labour much earlier in the growth process and one where demand for skilled 
labour may rise even in very poor economies. India it could be argued is an exemplar of such 
possibilities. These very different paradigms imply very different views of how higher education will 
link to the development process.  
 
Can Africa use its investment in higher skilled labour to affect such a service based growth 
revolution? The appearance of clusters of skilled labour in parts of some African countries has 19 
 
suggested such a possibility.
4 Two aspects of this possible transformation need to be noted. The first 
is that any such process involves a shift away from public sector employment as being the most 
important source of employment for the higher educated. The second is that a common factor across 
both the Chinese and Indian experience is that the high growth sectors were able to produce goods 
which were competitive at international prices. While Africa is producing jobs in self-employment for 
the higher educated this link to exporting is largely missing. While it remains so the alternative picture 
of self-employment as an employer of last resort for those whose education no longer gets them the 
wage job they seek may be the reality facing many job seekers in Africa. 
 
What both our micro and macro data has shown is that the return to education appears to rise with its 
level. The evidence is not clear cut that it is highest at the tertiary level but that certainly seems to be 
the case for wage employment within Africa. If this is so, and the underlying earnings function facing 
those investing in education is convex, then there is a substantial “option” value to education which 
can explain how a massive excess demand for such education can co-exist with very modest effects at 
the macro level of the investment in education on the level of incomes in African countries.  
 
That finding highlights the policy dilemma facing those deciding on investments in education. As post 
secondary education is only available to those with lower levels, investing in primary and secondary 
is a pre-condition to being able to expand education at the tertiary level. At present we have very 
little, if any, evidence that the expansion at primary education that has occurred has resulted in 
increased incomes. Will expanding beyond that level be more effective? The evidence we have 
presented in this paper suggests that the answer to that question may depend on how educational 
expansion is linked to other forms of investment and those linkages remain very poorly understood.  
  
  
                                                      
4 Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2007) provides an interesting account of the development of a computer hardware cluster 
in Otigba Nigeria which illustrates the possible link between highly skilled labour and self-employment. 
Mousley (2010) discusses this issue more generally in the context of Nigeria. 20 
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Appendix 1:  The countries in the sample 
World Bank Code  Country 
BDI Burundi 
BEN Benin 
BWA Botswana 
CAF  Central African Republic 
CIV Cote  d`Ivoire 
CMR Cameroon 
COG  Congo, Republic of 
GAB Gabon 
GHA Ghana 
GMB Gambia,  The 
KEN Kenya 
LBR Liberia 
LSO Lesotho 
MLI Mali 
MOZ Mozambique 
MRT Mauritania 
MUS Mauritius 
MWI Malawi 
NAM Namibia 
NER Niger 
RWA Rwanda 
SDN Sudan 
SEN Senegal 
SLE Sierra  Leone 
SWZ Swaziland 
TGO Togo 
TZA Tanzania 
UGA Uganda 
ZAF South  Africa 
ZAR Congo,  Dem.  Rep. 
ZMB Zambia 
ZWE Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 2: Constructing a measure of physical capital 
 
The PWT6.3 data set contains no information on the stock of physical capital. Following Klenow and 
Rodríguez-Clare (1997) such data are constructed using the capital accumulation equation 
 
 it t i it I K K    1 , 1  ,   t = 1950, 1951,..., 2007, 
where I is investment in physical capital and t denotes year. This procedure requires data on 
investment, initial capital (  ,    ) and the depreciation rate. 
 
Investment: Investment data is obtained by using the following formula: 
 
000 , 1     it it it it pop rgdpl ki I , 
where  rgdpl is the PWT6.3 variable for real GDP per capita (Laspeyres); ki is the investment share 
of rgdpl; and pop is the population divided by 1,000.  
 
Initial Capital: For each country we define the initial capital-output ratio as 
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
     , 
where i, g and n are country averages of the investment to output ratio (ki), the growth rate of per 
capita income (based on the PWT6.3 variable rgdpl) and the population growth rate (based on pop), 
respectively, for all observations available in the 1950-1965 period. The depreciation rate is set as 
explained in the next paragraph. The above expression is the Solow equation for the capital-output 
ratio in the steady state. A similar procedure for estimating the initial capital-output ratio has been 
used by Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997). We then obtain an estimate of the initial capital stock 
by multiplying the estimated     ⁄       by 1950 real GDP:  
            ⁄                                  .  
Depreciation: Following Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) we set δ   0.05.  
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics 
The Data: 1960-2004  Mean Median  Sd  Min  Max 
Y  GDP per Capita (rgdpl)  2440  1454  2409  354  16421 
K  Capital per Capita  3556  2033  3941  301  26000 
Ly  Ln(GDP  per  Capita)  7.48 7.28 0.75 5.87 9.71 
Lk  Ln(Capital  per  capita)  7.67 7.62 1.00 5.71  10.17 
lY  Ln(GDP) 22.81  22.79  1.16  19.95  26.73 
lK  Ln (Capital)  23.01  22.95  1.24  20.00  27.03 
Yr_sch 
(a)  Years  of  schooling    2.91 2.56 1.91 0.19 8.84 
Yr_sch_pri  Years  of  primary  schooling    2.23 1.97 1.35 0.17 5.96 
Yr_sch_sec  Years of secondary schooling   0.65  0.38  0.67  0.01  3.13 
Yr_sch_ter  Years of tertiary schooling   0.03  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.31 
Number of observations = 280 
The Data: 2000-2004 (the final period of the five year averages for the PENN 6.3 World Tables and 2000 for the 
education data) 
Y  GDP per Capita (rgdpl)  2859 1546 3406  354  16421 
K  Capital per Capita  4337 1933 5684  462  26000 
Ly  Ln(GDP per Capita)  7.51 7.34 0.90 5.87 9.71 
Lk  Ln(Capital per capita)  7.76 7.57 1.08 6.14  10.17 
lY  Ln(GDP)  23.35 23.25  1.12 20.92 26.73 
lK  Ln (Capital)  23.60 23.36  1.09 21.55 27.03 
Yr_sch  Years of schooling   4.60 4.27 2.08 1.05 8.84 
Yr_sch_pri  Years of primary schooling   3.36 3.40 1.44 0.93 5.85 
Yr_sch_sec  Years of secondary schooling   1.18 1.00 0.82 0.11 3.13 
Yr_sch_ter  Years of tertiary schooling   0.06 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.31 
Number of observations = 32 
The Data: 1960-2004. These growth rates refer to the averages across the five year periods. 
d_Yr_sch  Change in Years of Schooling  0.40 0.33 0.32  -0.61 2.19 
d_Yr_sch_pri  Change in Years of Schooling  0.27 0.25 0.20  -0.60 1.22 
d_Yr_sch_sec  Change in Years of Schooling  0.12 0.08 0.15  -0.22 0.92 
d_Yr_sch_ter  Change in Years of Schooling  0.01 0.00 0.01  -0.04 0.07 
d_ly  Change in Ln(GDP per Capita)  0.03 0.03 0.15  -0.53 0.57 
d_lk  Change in Ln(Capital per Capita)  0.04 0.02 0.16  -0.45 0.70 
Number of observations = 257 
All the years of schooling variables refer to the average levels of schooling of the population aged over 15. 
For the GDP and capital variables the data is five year averages over the period 1960 to 2004. The data is from 
the PENN World Tables 6.3, Heston, Summers and Aten (2009) and is in constant international 2005 US$ 
prices. 
 